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ABSTRACT
To learn from the past, we analyse 1,088 “computer as a target” judgments for evidential rea-
soning by extracting four case elements: decision, intent, fact, and evidence. Analysing the
decision element is essential for studying the scale of sentence severity for cross-jurisdictional
comparisons. Examining the intent element can facilitate future risk assessment. Analysing
the fact element can enhance an organization’s capability of analysing criminal activities
for future offender profiling. Examining the evidence used against a defendant from pre-
vious judgments can facilitate the preparation of evidence for upcoming legal disclosure.
Following the concepts of argumentation diagrams, we develop an automatic judgment sum-
marizing system to enhance the accessibility of judgments and avoid repeating past mis-
takes. Inspired by the feasibility of extracting legal knowledge for argument construction
and employing grounds of inadmissibility for probability assessment, we conduct evidential
reasoning of kernel traces for forensic readiness. We integrate the narrative methods from
attack graphs/languages for preventing confirmation bias, the argumentative methods from
argumentation diagrams for constructing legal arguments, and the probabilistic methods
from Bayesian networks for comparing hypotheses.
Keywords: legal knowledge extraction, forensic readiness, evidential reasoning, kernel trac-
ing, attack description languages, argumentation diagrams, Bayesian networks
1. INTRODUCTION
“A case is only as strong as its evidence”
(Torpey, 2009). Many computer crime cases
are closed due to the lack of evidence, and
the most common reason is not preparing
for upcoming legal disclosure at all, which
is equivalent to covering the tracks for per-
petrators (Rowlingson, 2004). Moreover,
covering the tracks has become the stan-
dard operating procedure for perpetrators
(Graves, 2007). To meet the burden of proof,
we should establish an information retention
strategy to prepare for upcoming legal dis-
closure (International Organization for Stan-
dardization, 2015), instead of merely relying
on the evidence remained.
Since digital evidence is more suscepti-
ble to tampering and subsequent modifica-
tion than traditional documents, it causes
more uncertainties in legal cases, such as
using the Trojan horse defense to avoid a
conviction (Brenner, Carrier, & Henninger,
2004). What is worse, forged digital evidence
can result in miscarriages of justice, such as
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framing victims by planting digital evidence.
To prevent miscarriages of justice caused by
false evidence, we have to consider evidence
reliability early in the collection phase by
choosing more reliable evidence sources, in-
stead of merely securing evidence with tam-
per resistance and detection techniques later
in the preservation phase.
To facilitate the preparation of reliable ev-
idence before the occurrence of legal actions,
we emphasise the domain of computer crime
and analyse the ”computer as a target” judg-
ments for evidential reasoning through case
element extraction in Section 2. Inspired by
the effectiveness of case elements and the
feasibility of transforming them into argu-
mentation diagrams, we integrate the narra-
tive methods, the argumentative methods,
and the probabilistic methods to produce
scenarios through attack graphs/languages,
generate hypotheses through argumentation
diagrams, and assess probabilities through
Bayesian networks in Section 3. Section 4
concludes the paper with the discussion of
the effectiveness of method integration for
evidential reasoning.
2. ANALYSING
JUDGMENTS FOR
EVIDENTIAL
REASONING
To learn from the past, we analyse 1,088
“computer as a target” judgments through
language engineering techniques for eviden-
tial reasoning. We explain our analysis
methods and findings as follows:
2.1 Related Work
Distinguished from previous studies on le-
gal knowledge extraction, we emphasise the
analysis of “computer as a target” judge-
ments written in Chinese characters from
four case elements: decision, intent, fact,
and evidence. Table 1 presents a compar-
ative analysis of previous research on le-
gal text summarization and analysis from
three perspectives: language, corpus, and el-
ements. Previous studies mostly collect and
analyse judgments written in English, and
mainly focus on general criminal cases. To
extend the research scope, we emphasise the
domain of computer crime and analyse the
”computer as a target” judgments for evi-
dential reasoning.
2.2 Collecting “Computer as a
Target” Judgments
The criminal activities targeting at com-
puters demand more technical knowledge
than the activities utilizing computers as
tools. Therefore, we emphasise the analy-
sis of “computer as a target” judgments for
evidential reasoning. Since different jurisdic-
tions have their own computer crime laws,
we need to employ different search terms
based on the corresponding computer crime
laws for judgment collection.
Chinese judgments are available at the
website wenshu.court.gov.cn (China Judge-
ments Online) for public access. The Crim-
inal Law of the People’s Republic of China
clearly differentiates between the “computer
as a target” crime and the “computer as
a tool” crime in separate articles. There-
fore, we employ “computer information sys-
tem” as the search term for “case name”
to collect judgments regarding “illegal inva-
sion of computer information system” and
“deleting, altering, adding or jamming the
functions of the computer information sys-
tem” (Council of Europe, 2008). We em-
ploy Scrapy (Scrapinghub, Ltd., 2015), an
open source Web crawler, and utilize the
XML path language to locate and retrieve
the judgment content. We categorize the
collected Chinese judgments into two judg-
ment types: first instance and appeal. We
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Table 1. A Summary of Research on Legal Text Summarization and Analysis
Author(s) Language Corpus Elements
Gelbart and Smith English
more than 1000 economic loss cases and
general British Columbia cases
legal concepts, statute citations, case citations,
and facts
Schweighofer et al. English
75 full text documents of court decisions
from the European Community law database
index with the thesaurus entries
Uyttendaele et al. Dutch
more than 3000 decisions
from the correctional Court of Leuven
superscription, victim, accused, alleged offenses,
transition formulation, opinion of the court,
legal foundations, verdict, and conclusion
Farzindar and Lapalme English
3500 judgments from
the Federal Court of Canada
four thematic segmentations: introduction, context,
juridical analysis, and conclusion
Hachey and Grover English 188 judgments from the UK House of Lords
seven rhetorical annotations: fact, proceedings,
background, framing, disposal, textual, and other
Saravanan et al. English
200 judgments related to rent control,
income tax and sales tax
seven rhetorical roles: identifying the case,
establishing facts of the case, arguing the case,
history of the case, arguments,
ratio of the decision, and final decision
Chieze et al.
English
French
14,380 historical decisions from Canadian
federal courts and provincial tribunals
four thematic segments (Mailhot & Carnwath, 1998):
introduction, context, reasoning, and conclusion
Wyner English
47 criminal cases drawn from the California
Supreme Court and State Court of Appeal
case citations, names of parties, roles of parties,
and final decision
Yousfi-Monod et al.
English
French
3715 decisions from the Canadian courts
four decision sections: introduction, context,
reasoning and conclusion
Galgani et al. English
5705 case reports
from the Federal Court of Australia
collected catchphrases, such as courts and judges,
corporations, costs, etc.
found 26 duplicated judgments, two judg-
ments without content, and four irrelevant
judgments while collecting Chinese judg-
ments.
As for Taiwan, the Judicial Yuan makes
legislative and judicial texts accessible at
the website jirs.judicial.gov.tw, and we uti-
lize “offenses against the computer security”
as the search term for “cause of action”
and “criminal case” as “judgment type” for
judgment collection. Since certain charac-
ter in the case number represents different
judgment types, we can categorize the col-
lected Taiwanese judgments into six judg-
ment types: prosecution, summary judg-
ment, appeal, civil action, private prosecu-
tion, and mediation. The most common
types of Taiwanese judgments are prosecu-
tion and summary judgment, which form
88.9% of the collected Taiwanese judgments.
The average character count of summary
judgments is around half of the prosecution
judgments, which are 2820.58, and 5801.13
respectively. We also found two duplicated
judgments while collecting Taiwanese judg-
ments. Until May 29th 2016, we totally col-
lect 1,088 “computer as a target” judgments:
358 Chinese judgments and 730 Taiwanese
judgments.
Figure 1 shows the number of “computer
as a target” judgments by judgment year.
The Criminal Law of the People’s Repub-
lic of China incriminates “illegal invasion of
computer information system” and “delet-
ing, altering, adding or jamming the func-
tions of the computer information system” in
1997, whereas Criminal Code of the Republic
of China incriminates “offenses against the
computer security” in 2003. However, there
is only one Chinese judgment concerning
“computer as a target” crime before 2011,
and the number of judgments collected in
China is less than in Taiwan. The number
of “computer as a target” judgments is much
less than expected considering the number of
incidents reported.
2.3 Extracting Case Elements
To analyse the “computer as a target” judg-
ments for evidential reasoning, we deter-
mine four case elements for legal knowledge
extraction: decision, intent, fact, and evi-
c© 2016 ADFSL Page 39
JDFSL V11N1 Evidential Reasoning for Forensic ...
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
0
50
100
150
Year
N
u
m
b
er
of
J
u
d
ge
m
en
ts
Taiwan China
Figure 1. Number of “computer as a target”
Judgments by Year
dence. Examining the decision element is
essential for studying the scale of sentence
severity, which can serve as a criterion for
cross-jurisdictional comparisons. Analysing
the intent element is indispensable to threat
analysis, which can facilitate future risk as-
sessment. Examining the fact element can
enhance an organization’s capability of un-
derstanding criminal behaviours for future
offender profiling. Analysing the evidence
used against a defendant from previous judg-
ments can facilitate the preparation of evi-
dence before the occurrence of legal actions.
To extract case elements, we employ
five processing resources (Cunningham et
al., 2014) provided by GATE (Cunningham,
2002), an open source language engineer-
ing software, to locate annotations from the
“computer as a target” judgments, which we
list as follows:
1. RegEx Sentence Splitter annotates
sentences according to the files con-
taining regular expressions of sentence
splits, which we utilize as the indicators
of different judgment stages: decision,
fact, and reasoning. Regarding a judg-
ment as a transaction, Cheng (2010)
determines generic structures of Chi-
nese and Taiwanese judgments by iden-
tifying various stages and legal func-
tions. The orders of stages are different
between Chinese and Taiwanese judg-
ments, which are shown in Table 2. Chi-
nese judgments establish the fact first,
then justify the decision, and finally de-
clare the decision. On the other hand,
Taiwanese judgments declare the deci-
sion first, then establish the fact, and
eventually justify the decision.
Despite different stage orders, the case
elements exist within the same stages.
For Chinese judgments, we utilize RegEx
Sentence Splitter to locate the lin-
guistic markers of the fact and evidence
elements, which we later extract the
first paragraph between them as the fact
element by JAPE Transducer. As for
Taiwanese judgments, we employ RegEx
Sentence Splitter to locate the lin-
guistic markers as the separator be-
tween the decision and intent elements.
2. GATE Unicode Tokeniser divides
judgments into smaller tokens, such
as punctuations and numbers. We
customize GATE Unicode Tokeniser
to annotate one or more occurrences
of Unicode character between punc-
tuations as a token, which we regard
as a sentence for further higher-level
annotations by JAPE Transducer.
3. ANNIE Gazetteer aims to search the
pre-defined words for further annota-
tion by JAPE Transducer. We set the
“wholeWordsOnly” parameter to false
to allow ANNIE Gazetteer to match
not only whole words. Due to the
different judgment structures, we em-
ploy different linguistic markers to dif-
ferent jurisdictions, which are summa-
rized in Table 2. Currently we gen-
erate these linguistic markers manually
through analysing the indicators of dif-
ferent judgment stages and case ele-
ments. We only update the linguis-
tic markers to processing resources after
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Table 2. The Analysis of Judgments for Case Element Extraction
Stage Element Linguistic Markers Processing Resources
China
fact
intent
intent=[purpose, for, used] ANNIE Gazetteer
the sentence which contains intent JAPE Transducer
fact
fact start=[the prosecutor accused, procuratorate accused, after being examined]
evidence start=[the above fact, given with evidence, to support the above allegation]
RegEx Sentence Splitter
the first paragraph between fact start and evidence start JAPE Transducer
reasoning evidence
evidence start=[the above fact, given with evidence, to support the above allegation]
evidence end=[this court thinks, sufficient to justify, is consistent with fact]
ANNIE Gazetteer
the sentences between evidence start and evidence end JAPE Transducer
decision decision
decision start=[the decision is as follows, based on the defendant]
decision=[is sentenced]
ANNIE Gazetteer
after decision start, the sentence which contains decision JAPE Transducer
Taiwan
decision decision
fact start=[reason, crime fact] RegEx Sentence Splitter
guilty=[detention, imprisonment, probation, fine]
length=[day, month, year, dollar]
other=[not guilty, dismissal, overrule, dismissal, jurisdictional error, summary judgement, grounds for appeal]
ANNIE Gazetteer
before fact start, the sentences which contain guilty and length or contain other JAPE Transducer
fact
intent
fact start=[reason, crime fact] RegEx Sentence Splitter
intent=[intent, intent, mens rea, based, for not, discontent] ANNIE Gazetteer
after fact start, the sentence which contains intent JAPE Transducer
fact the paragraph after the sentence which contains intent JAPE Transducer
reasoning evidence
evidence list start=[evidence, evidence of fact, basis of fact, evidence name, evidence part, based on the evidence,
the following evidence, sufficient evidence to prove, the following evidence to prove]
evidence start=[based on, the above fact, the above crime fact, mainly based on, basis of crime fact]
evidence ref =[indictment, as reference]
ANNIE Gazetteer
after evidence list start, the sentences which contains parentheses
the paragraph which contains evidence start
the sentence which contains evidence ref
JAPE Transducer
verifying the enhanced annotation cov-
erage. However, the diverse usages of
legal terms by different judges obstruct
the automatic generation of linguistic
markers.
4. JAPE Transducer recognises higher-
level annotations through regular ex-
pressions. For example, after we utilize
ANNIE Gazetteer to locate the linguis-
tic markers for the start of the decision
element “the decision is as follows” and
the keyword of the decision element “is
sentenced” from Chinese judgments, we
extract the sentences which contain “is
sentenced” after “the decision is as fol-
lows” as the decision elements by JAPE
Transducer.
5. Flexible Exporter saves the annota-
tions to files. After locating four case
elements from judgments, we employ
Flexible Exporter to store the anno-
tations for further analysis and visual-
ization.
2.4 Verifying Annotation
Coverage
Table 3 presents the number of judgments
collected, the average character count, and
the number of case element not found ac-
cording to different judgment types. Since
there is no frequently used term to indicate
the intent in Chinese judgments, we fail to
extract the intent element from 134 Chinese
judgments, from which we can observe that
the pre-defined words in ANNIE Gazetteer
lists greatly influence the accuracy of el-
ement extraction. Analysing the annota-
tion coverage from the judgment types, we
fail to extract almost all the case elements
from 26 Taiwanese judgments of civil ac-
tion and mediation types due to the lack
of element in these judgments. Moreover,
since we utilize RegEx Sentence Splitter
to locate the linguistic markers as the sep-
arator between the decision and intent ele-
ments for Taiwanese judgments, extracting
the decision element will fail if there is no
separator for RegEx Sentence Splitter to
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locate. Not every Taiwanese judgment has
the same judgment stages, even though Tai-
wanese judgments have more identifiable lin-
guistic markers to separate judgment stages
than Chinese judgments.
Table 3. A Summary of Collected Chinese
and Taiwanese Judgments
China
Judgment
Type
Avg. Char
Count
Judgment
Number
Number of Case Element not Found
Decision Intent Fact Evidence
first instance 4160.06 302 4 110 3 22
appeal 5922.93 56 42 24 12 17
Taiwan
prosecution 5801.13 331 32 119 121 199
summary judgment 2820.58 318 14 97 97 149
appeal 5138.14 50 2 13 13 22
civil action 677.52 23 18 23 23 23
private prosecution 5145.40 5 1 1 1 2
mediation 513.00 3 3 3 3 3
2.5 Judgment Analysis
Findings
After analysing 1,088 “computer as a target”
judgments through case element extraction,
we describe the major findings as follows:
2.5.1 Effectiveness of Case Elements
The decision element serves as a good crite-
rion to analyse the scale of sentence sever-
ity for cross-jurisdictional comparisons. Re-
garding not guilty as zero days, the average
length of imprisonment is 962.07 days based
on the decision elements extracted from Chi-
nese judgments. On the other hand, the
average length of imprisonment is 170.46
days according to Taiwanese decision ele-
ments, which is not that severe compared to
the maximum three or five years imprison-
ment regulated in criminal code on offenses
against the computer security. We can ob-
serve the defendants who commit computer
crime tend to be sentenced more severely in
China than those in Taiwan, even though
the number of judgments collected in China
is less than in Taiwan. Note that the writ-
ten numbers are different between Taiwanese
and Chinese judgments; most of Taiwanese
judgments use financial characters, whereas
Chinese judgments use normal characters.
Studying the intent element is beneficial
for future risk assessment, even though it is
difficult to have solid evidence to prove the
intent of a defendant. Since threat is one
of the indispensable components of risk, and
threat possesses intent and capability, exam-
ining the intent element is advantageous for
risk assessment and determining the level of
security control to protect information as-
sets. According to 224 intent elements ex-
tracted from Chinese judgments, the most
common intent is to gain the illegal benefits.
On the other hand, based on 474 intent ele-
ments extracted from Taiwanese judgments,
the intent “for purpose to exercise unlawful
control over others property” is more popu-
lar than the intent of gaining the illegal ben-
efits.
The fact elements extracted are well con-
structed and describe the events that pre-
viously occurred in narrative forms, which
can facilitate the analysis of criminal ac-
tivities for further crime scenario construc-
tion and offender profiling. Based on 343
fact elements extracted from Chinese judg-
ments, the common activities include in-
stalling Trojan horse for stealing money from
on-line accounts, and even selling bots for
distributed denial-of-service attacks. Ac-
cording to 472 fact elements extracted Tai-
wanese judgments, the most common be-
haviour is the illegal possession of others’ ac-
counts.
Analysing the evidence element facilitates
the preparation of evidence before the oc-
currence of legal actions. An organization
should establish an information retention
strategy to prepare for upcoming legal dis-
closure (International Organization for Stan-
dardization, 2015), which can be easily clar-
ified by analysing the evidence used against
a defendant from previous judgments. How-
ever, based on the total 651 evidence el-
ements extracted Chinese and Taiwanese
judgments, we observe the digital evidence
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supporting the “computer as a target” cases
rarely stands alone. Even the “computer as
a target” cases still depend heavily on non-
digital evidence, such as testimonials, docu-
ments, or confessions.
2.5.2 Transformation into
Argumentation Diagrams
Based on the case elements extracted from
judgments, we can follow the concepts of da-
tum and claim from the Toulmin model of
argument (Toulmin, 2003), which are shown
in Figure 2, to develop an automatic judg-
ment summarizing system. Taking the file
generated by Flexible Exporter as input,
we visualize the case elements with DOT, a
plain text graph description language, and
employ Graphviz (Ellson, Gansner, Kout-
sofios, North, & Woodhull, 2001), an open
source graph drawing tool, to convert the
DOT files to PDF files.
Evidence EvidenceEvidence
Intent
Decision
Guilty
Decision
Not Guilty
dependencies
Fact
support
Fact
Figure 2. Transformation of Case Elements
into Argumentation Diagrams
Figure 3 presents an overview of the mea-
sures and procedures for automatic judg-
ment summarization. Figure 4 presents an
automatically generated argumentation dia-
gram from a Chinese judgment. Using rect-
angles to represent a fact or an observation
and ovals to present a consequent assertion
(Shum, 2003), we summarize the “computer
as a target” judgments automatically in a
consistent format, which can enhance the
accessibility and readability of judgments.
Since the fact element describes the previ-
ously occurred events in chronological or-
der, we divide the fact element into shorter
phrases, and list the phrases from top to bot-
tom for better comprehensibility of criminal
activities. We also categorize the evidence
element into digital evidence and non-digital
evidence to demonstrate that the “computer
as a target” judgments do not depend heav-
ily on digital evidence as expected.
Collecting Legal Texts
Web crawler: Scrapy
Legal Text Engineering
language engineering software: GATE
RegEx Sentence Splitter 
GATE Unicode Tokeniser
ANNIE Gazetteer
JAPE Transducer
Flexible Exporter
Non-Digital EvidenceDigital Evidence
dependencies
Fact
support
Intent
Decision
dependencies
Visualizing Case Elements
graph visualization software: Graphviz
output
Figure 3. An Overview of an Automatic
Judgment Summarizing System
2.5.3 Grounds of Inadmissibility
The gathered evidence only become admis-
sible when it meets the criteria of relevance
and reliability. Based on collected Chi-
nese and Taiwanese judgments, the grounds
of inadmissibility include processed by un-
qualified personnel, diverse malware analy-
sis result, inaccurate calculation of monetary
value, no evidential connection, reasonable
doubt, etc. Analysis outcomes of the admis-
sibility and inadmissibility of evidence from
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Digital Evidence
Non-Digital Evidence
判处有期徒刑三年三个月
Intent 被告人朴文华以非法占有为目的
Fact
2014年1月至6月期间
被告人朴文华利用发送木马程序从赌博网站计算机信息系统中非法获取易宝账号及密码身份认证信息34组
并将部分易宝账户内资金共计109664元转入其个人使用的卡号为建设银行43×××91账户
身份认证信息数据整理记录
电子证据检查工作记录
电子数据检验鉴定意见
易宝账号及密码等计算机信息系统数据
木马程序等电子数据等证据证实
被告人在开庭审理过程中亦无异议
且有书证户籍证明
案件来源
抓捕经过
刑事判决书
易宝支付有限公司交易出款记录查询明细
银行交易明细
证据保全清单
冻结财产通知书回执
情况说明
照片
证人柏某的证言
搜查笔录
检查笔录
Figure 4. An Automatically Generated Ar-
gumentation Diagram from a Chinese Judg-
ment
the “computer as a target” judgments are
valuable inputs for probability assessment.
Extracting 5W1H information and other fac-
tors affecting the scale of sentence severity
can also assist the calculation of probabili-
ties.
2.5.4 Need for Forensic Readiness
Since the criminal activities targeting at
computers demand more technical knowl-
edge than general criminal cases, the “com-
puter as a target” judgments are supposed
to depend heavily on digital evidence. How-
ever, based on the evidence elements ex-
tracted, we discover the digital evidence
rarely stands alone, even for supporting the
“computer as a target” cases. Moreover,
since the number of incidents reported are
much more than the number of judgments,
there must be many “computer as a target”
cases closed before being brought to courts.
It is essential for organisations to prepare
themselves for digital forensics with reliable
digital evidence, in other words- forensic
readiness.
3. EVIDENTIAL
REASONING OF
KERNEL TRACES
To learn from the past, we analyse previous
“computer as a target” judgments for evi-
dential reasoning in Section 2. To set out
the future, organisations can prepare them-
selves for upcoming legal disclosure with re-
liable digital evidence, such as kernel traces,
the low-level execution logs of operating sys-
tems (Giraldeau, Desfossez, Goulet, Dage-
nais, & Desnoyers, 2011). To conduct evi-
dential reasoning of kernel traces for foren-
sic readiness, we propose a framework by
integrating the narrative methods from at-
tack graphs/languages, the argumentative
methods from argumentation diagrams, and
the probabilistic methods from Bayesian net-
works, which is shown in Figure 5.
3.1 Related Work
Distinguished from previous studies on
method integration for evidential reasoning
and interpretation, which are summarized in
Table 4, we employ the narrative methods
from attack graphs and attack description
languages to emphasise the investigation of
information security incidents in this paper.
Table 4. A Summary of Method Integration
for Evidential Reasoning
Author(s)
Methods
Narrative Argumentative Probabilistic
Hepler et al. x x
F. J. Bex et al. x x
Condliffe et al. x x
Vlek et al. x x
Verheij x x x
Timmer et al. x x
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Condition
[reliability module]
Condition
[reliability module]
Scenario
[probability module]
Scenario
[probability module]
IDS database
[reliability module]
Condition
[reliability module]
Legal idiom
[probability module]
Legal idiom
[probability module]
Legal idiom
[probability module]
inferences
Elements of crimes
[reliability module]
Hypothesis
[probability module]
Hypothesis
[probability module]
support support
Gather information Gain access
Network connect()
File access()
Intent Explaining-away
Guilty Not guilty
Cover tracks
Network send() 
File chown()
Process execve() 
File chmod()
Signal kill() 
File rmdir()
dependencies
Kernel traces
[reliability module]
Proposed Framework ExampleKnowledge Base
Figure 5. The Framework for Evidential Reasoning of Kernel Traces
3.2 Producing Scenarios
through Attack
Graphs/Languages
Producing scenarios automatically can re-
duce the possibility of bias and errors.
Once a suspect has been targeted, the evi-
dence gathering process tends to become re-
stricted to supporting the guilt of the sus-
pect. To keep investigators from the confir-
mation bias, we suggest to employ the es-
sential elements of attack description lan-
guages (Cuppens & Ortalo, 2000; Templeton
& Levitt, 2000; Cheung, Lindqvist, & Fong,
2003): pre-conditions (require capabilities)
and post-conditions (provide capabilities) as
datums, and scenarios as claims, to produce
scenarios automatically from kernel traces.
Attack graphs aim to represent the poten-
tial intrusion paths for security vulnerabil-
ity analysis, whereas attack description lan-
guages usually address the generic descrip-
tion issues for knowledge interchange. De-
spite the differences, both of them are effec-
tive narrative methods to demonstrate in-
formation security incidents. Table 5 sum-
marizes the elements to present information
security incidents in a narrative form. The
pre-condition is the set of resources required
for an attack to occur (e.g. the host vul-
nerability information and the communica-
tion connectivity), the scenario is the set of
events of an attack, and the post-condition is
the set of resources obtained by a successful
attack.
Table 5. A Summary of Attack Graphs and
Languages
Author(s)
Graph/Language Elements
Nodes Edges Edge Weight
Phillips and Swiler stages of attack actions, conditions success probability
Ortalo et al. privileges vulnerabilities efforts required
Cuppens and Ortalo pre-condition, post-condition, scenario, detection, verification
Ritchey and Ammann hosts, connectivity matrix, exploits
Templeton and Levitt require capabilities, provide capabilities, actions
Eckmann et al. states, transitions
Michel and M exploit, detection, response
Cheung et al. pre-condition, post-condition
Noel et al. exploits, conditions dependencies hardening costs
Ou et al. attack goal, derivation, fact dependencies n/a
The scenario producing process requires
the knowledge similar to the database of in-
trusion detection systems, which holds the
security-related events correlated based on
different system resources (e.g. file system,
process management, and network). Us-
ing system resources for correlation not only
increases the possibility of integrating ker-
nel traces from other operating systems, but
also enhances the comprehensibility of at-
tack stages. Since the post-condition of a
scenario can be the pre-condition of the fol-
lowing scenario, it is effortless to understand
the intent of acquiring specific system re-
sources.
For instance, if the database of security-
related events defines the scenario of gath-
ering information as pre-conditions of initi-
ating a connection on a socket and check-
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ing user’s permissions for a file, and post-
conditions of sending a message on a socket
and changing ownership of a file, we can pro-
duce the scenario of gathering information
automatically from gathered kernel traces.
Similarly, we can produce the scenario of
covering tracks with pre-conditions of exe-
cuting program and changing permissions of
a file, and post-conditions of sending signal
to a process and deleting a directory.
3.3 Generating Hypotheses
through Argumentation
Diagrams
Convicting a defendant demands construct-
ing legal arguments. To assist investiga-
tors to construct legal arguments, we sug-
gest to employ the concepts of datum and
claim from the Toulmin model of argument
(Toulmin, 2003) and legal idioms, such as
evidence-accuracy idioms and intent idioms
(Fenton, Neil, & Lagnado, 2013), for hypoth-
esis generation.
Argumentation diagrams aim to represent
the structure of an argument visually, which
can facilitate the crime scenario construc-
tion, crime investigation, and decision sup-
port from a legal perspective. However, ar-
gument diagramming requires facts, argu-
ments, and evidence as input data, which
mainly depends on manual user input. Ta-
ble 6 summarizes the elements to represent
information security incidents in an argu-
mentative form.
Table 6. A Summary of Argumentation Di-
agrams
Author(s)
Graph Elements
Nodes Edges Edge Weight
Goodwin facts probative processes belief strength
Toulmin datum, warrant, claim, backing, rebuttal certainty n/a
Verheij statements support/attack n/a
Reed and Rowe reconstructed enthymemes, refutations support n/a
Chesevar et al. claims, applications of schemes support n/a
Keppens and Schafer facts, evidence, assumptions, hypothesis causal relations n/a
F. Bex et al. data, inference, scheme inferential relations n/a
Gordon statements, testimonial evidence inferential relations argument strength
An automatic judgment summarizing sys-
tem, which we have developed in Section 2,
can minimize the manual effort required for
hypothesis generation and provide knowl-
edge for developing legal idioms from scenar-
ios. Examining the evidence used against
a defendant from previous judgments con-
stantly can also solidify legal cases and avoid
repeating past mistakes. The decision ele-
ment corresponds to hypotheses, the intent
and fact elements fit into legal idioms, and
the scenarios can be considered as evidence
in narrative forms. The legal idioms devel-
oped can establish attack or support rela-
tions with the hypotheses generated, which
are normally mutually exclusive. For exam-
ple, Figure 5 consists of two mutually exclu-
sive hypotheses: the intruder is guilty or not
guilty.
3.4 Assessing Probabilities
through Bayesian
Networks
From a legal perspective, Bayesian networks
can facilitate the interpretation of compli-
cated relations between evidence, the mod-
elling of legal arguments and crime scenarios,
and the process of evidential reasoning. To
assist investigators to discover of the most
supported hypotheses, we suggest to employ
the qualitative probability (Keppens, 2007)
from Bayesian networks for probability as-
sessment.
Bayesian networks aim to present vari-
ables and their probabilistic relations in a
directed acyclic graph. Table 7 summarizes
the elements to present information secu-
rity incidents in a probabilistic form. Even
though Bayesian networks can present vari-
ables and their probabilistic relations in ac-
curate numbers, these numerical probabili-
ties demand huge amount of knowledge as
input for calculation.
The gathered evidence only become ad-
missible when it meets the criteria of rele-
vance and reliability. Since the developed
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Table 7. A Summary of Bayesian Networks
Regarding Legal Reasoning
Author(s)
Graph Elements
Nodes Edges Edge Weight
Zukerman et al. propositions inferences n/a
Hepler et al. modules, variables inferred hierarchy n/a
Keppens variables influences qualitative derivatives
F. J. Bex et al. observations, arguments, evidence inferences n/a
Condliffe et al. evidence variables inferred hierarchy n/a
Keppens variables inference probative force
Fenton et al. basic causal structures causal inferences probability
Vlek et al. scenarios dependencies n/a
Verheij hypotheses, evidence inferences strengths
Timmer et al. support factors support likelihood ratio
legal idioms attack or support the generated
hypotheses, the datums and the claims con-
nected to the legal idioms should be consid-
ered relevant. As for reliability, since a da-
tum is a fact or an observation, and a claim
is a consequent assertion that depends on
datums (Shum, 2003), based on the object
oriented concept (Hepler et al., 2007), we
suggest to assign a reliability module and a
qualitative probability module to each da-
tum and claim respectively.
A reliability module should contain a con-
ditional probability table from Bayesian net-
works, which can be derived from poten-
tial errors identified and vulnerability assess-
ment outcomes. For instance, we can use
the detection rate and false alarm rate as in-
put for the reliability module of the intrusion
detection system database required for pro-
ducing scenarios. Thus, we can make errors
present and transparent for a fair trial.
Since the comparison between different
hypotheses does not require precise numer-
ical probabilities, the qualitative approach
is enough in the context of forensic analysis
(Keppens, 2007). We suggest employing the
analysis of inadmissibility grounds as input
for calculation, assigning a qualitative prob-
ability module to a claim, and using different
levels of edge thickness to indicate different
levels of probability. For instance, we can
utilize sliders to present scales of probabil-
ity, which are shown in Figure 5.
4. CONCLUSIONS
AND FUTURE WORK
Inspired by the feasibility of extracting
legal knowledge for argument construc-
tion and employing grounds of inadmissi-
bility for probability assessment, we inte-
grate the narrative methods from attack
graphs/languages, the argumentative meth-
ods from argumentation diagrams, and the
probabilistic methods from Bayesian net-
works, to conduct evidential reasoning of
kernel traces for forensic readiness.
Employing the elements of pre-condition
and post-condition from attack description
languages, we can keep investigators from
confirmation bias, clarify the stages of at-
tacks, and prevent miscarriages of justice.
Following the concepts of datum and claim
from argumentation diagrams, we can assist
investigators to construct legal arguments.
Moreover, the automatic judgement summa-
rizing system developed can help investiga-
tors to solidify legal cases and avoid repeat-
ing past mistakes. Utilizing the ideas of le-
gal idioms and qualitative probability from
Bayesian networks, we can assist investiga-
tors to discover of the most supported hy-
potheses and assess the admissibility of gath-
ered evidence.
In addition to broadening the judgment
analysis scope for conducting comprehensive
cross-jurisdictional comparisons, we plan to
conduct a case study for evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed framework, and
broaden the element scope for deeper legal
knowledge extraction, such as 5W1H infor-
mation. We also need to ensure the privacy
implications for users are minimized to ac-
ceptable levels to alleviate the conflicts be-
tween accountability and privacy. We will
make the raw data and source code available
to interested researchers under an appropri-
ate open source licenses.
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